

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190026-8

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190026-8

SECRET

CIA/DNE/STAFF MEM/43-61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

10 August 1961

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 43-61

SUBJECT: Outlook for Yugoslavia

Khrushchev's Game with Belgrade

1. Whenever high-ranking Soviet or Yugoslav officials trade visits or talk to one another, questions naturally arise about the possibility of a change in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The recent visit to Moscow of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic and the issuance of the new Soviet Party Program, coming almost simultaneously, again raise the question of whether an improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations might be in the offing. For example, one of Popovic's advisers who accompanied him on the trip gave Western officials to understand that the party program would acknowledge that Yugoslavia was "building socialism," a step which would indeed have been an important gesture toward rapprochement.

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

2. Examination of the party program, however, reveals little for the Yugoslavs to be pleased about. Though it acknowledges that the Yugoslavs at one time "embarked on the road to socialism," it also says that subsequently, by their revisionist policy, they "set Yugoslavia off against the socialist camp", and created a danger "that the revolutionary conquests of the Yugoslav people would be lost." At another point the Yugoslav party program is referred to as most fully embodying "the ideology of revisionism." Thus, the Soviets, as they have before, are saying that the Yugoslav party became heretical by virtue of the views codified in its 1958 party program. Soviets still do not offer any judgment as to whether the Yugoslavs at present are on or off the road to socialism. The Soviets perhaps still are trying to convey to the Yugoslavs that the door is still open for a return to their former status, provided they recant. This is probably as far as the Soviets felt they could go (and they may have told Popovic as much in Moscow) in the face of Chinese and Albanian claims that the Yugoslavs, far from building socialism, have deserted to the enemy and become outright "imperialist agents."

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

3. The Yugoslavs, for their part, are far from pleased with the references to Yugoslavia in the Soviet party program. In their commentaries, the Yugoslavs have forcefully reaffirmed many of the very doctrinal positions which have caused offense to the Soviets in the past.

25X1

4. In Nie 15-61, "The Outlook for Yugoslavia," we said that the doctrinal gap between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties was so great that "it is unlikely to be bridged in the absence of fundamental concessions by either side." The Soviets have not made such concessions in their party program nor are they likely to in the future. Nor is there any indication that the Yugoslavs contemplate any such changes. The Yugoslavs continue to hope that the Bloc will change and "will become a looser grouping of genuinely autonomous Communist states with which they can once again develop closer and more intimate relations." In any event, they value their present freedom of maneuver and the other advantages of independence far too much to subordinate their country or party to the control of others.

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

5. The Popovic visit is probably most significant in terms of Soviet attitudes toward Yugoslavia. While Khrushchev clearly hopes that at some point Yugoslavia can again be associated with the Bloc, he must be concerned with Tito's growing influence among the uncommitted nations, which are also a prime target of Soviet policy. Khrushchev probably sought from Popovic the Yugoslav attitude toward various Soviet policies (e.g., disarmament, Berlin, the UN) in order to discover whether Belgrade was likely to aid or impede Soviet aims at the forthcoming conference of "neutrals".

25X1

5X1

[REDACTED] It has been clear for some time that Yugoslav views on such general questions as disarmament and colonialism generally parallel those of Moscow. Belgrade strongly sympathizes with the Soviet position on Berlin. Thus, the Soviets can be fairly confident that the Yugoslavs in general will lean more to Soviet than to Western positions on some of the major international issues.

6. We doubt that the Soviets accomplished, or desired to accomplish, much more than this during the visit. Basic Yugoslav views, rooted in their independent "non-Bloc" position, would, as in the past, prevent the Yugoslavs from full endorsement of Soviet positions. We do not think, for example, that the

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

Yugoslavs would go so far as to attend a conference to sign a peace treaty with East Germany which was attended only by Bloc countries. The Yugoslavs are themselves increasingly preoccupied with the uncommitted countries, and they desire, in the absence of fundamental change in the Bloc, to identify themselves with the "neutrals" rather than either "bloc."

7. Meanwhile, the visit served a subsidiary purpose for the USSR. It enabled the Soviets to thumb their noses at the Chinese and the Albanians, both of whom have long been pressing for an all-out hostile Bloc policy toward Yugoslavia. Albania, moreover, has seen previous Soviet-Yugoslav talks as insidious plots aimed at the unseating of the Albanian leaders. When Khrushchev and Gromyko toward the end of 1960 spoke of "identical" Soviet and Yugoslav views on many questions of foreign policy, as did the recent communique at the close of the Popovic visit, the Albanians responded with a long, ill-concealed diatribe in Zeri i Popullit against Soviet politics, especially those toward Yugoslavia. It must have been particularly galling, both to the Albanians and the Chinese, to see Pravda carry a photograph of Popovic standing on the podium in Moscow alongside Khrushchev and his faithful Balkan myrmidon, Todor Zhivkov.

25X1A

- 5 -

SECRET